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INSPECTIONS AT TIME OF
SALE OR TRANSFER*
BY OTTO J HETZEL**
I. BACKGROUND
Federal funding for housing programs in the United States has been
cut about seventy-five percent during the 1980s compared to funding
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Netherlands in June and July 1988. The Conference was sponsored by three research
institutes that are members of the Netherlands Organization of Research Institutes in
the field of housing and urban research: the Center for Metropolitan Research,
University of Amsterdam; the Institute of Geographical Research, University of
Utrecht; and the Research Institute for Policy Sciences and Technology, Delft
University of Technology.
** Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School, Detroit, Michigan;
B.A., The Pennsylvania State University; J.D., Yale Law School; LL.M., Harvard Law
School. The author was a counsel of record in Butcher v. City of Detroit, 131 Mich.
App. 698, 347 N.W.2d 260 (1984), 156 Mich. App. 165, 401 N.W.2d 260 (1986) and is
counsel of record in Joy Mgmt. v. City of Detroit, No. 85-51187 CH (Wayne County
Cir. Ct. 1988) appeal docketed No. 110685 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 1988), which is
pending in the Michigan Court of Appeals. The assistance of James Simmons in the
research and preparation of this Article is gratefully acknowledged.
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levels in the 1970s.' This reduction in federal support has meant that
local governments, which rely heavily on federal housing funds and are
relied upon to carry out federal housing policies at the local level, have
been forced to look to alternative housing strategies and funding
sources.
A. Code Enforcement Policies Emerged in the 1960s
The need to maintain and upgrade the existing housing stock, which
experienced significant deterioration in older cities, became a major
policy concern during the 1950s and 1960s.2 The Douglas Commission
and the Kaiser Committee, which were presidentially appointed in the
1960s to examine housing problems in the United States, gave particu-
lar attention and emphasis to the need for code. enforcement.3 Studies
that were part of the Douglas Commission's research stimulated two
noteworthy publications by Professor Frank Grad: Legal Remedies For
Housing Code Violations4 and Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions
and Remedies.' These analyses stress the need for enforcement, but
noted difficulties with traditional code enforcement approaches. En-
forcement of housing condition standards (codes) became a major fed-
eral policy objective in the 1960s and received considerable priority in
federal programs. 6 Code enforcement was looked to as a primary tech-
1. Nenno, Reagan Housing and Community Development Record: A Negative Rat-
ing, 40 J. HOUSING 135 (1983); Nenno, The Budget Battle-1985: Housing and Com-
munity Development Programs Under Fire, 42 J. HOUSING 127 (1985); OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, THE UNITED STATES BUDGET IN BRIEF, 1989 19 (1988).
See also Simons, Overview: Housing Options for the 1990's, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
259, 260 (1988).
2. D. MANDELKER, C. DAYE, 0. HETZEL, J. KUSHNER, H. MCGEE, & R. WASH-
BURN, HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 360 (1981).
3. See The Douglas Comission's UNITED STATES NATIONAL COMMISSION ON UR-
BAN PROBLEMS REPORT (1968) and the Kaiser Committee's REPORT OF THE PRESI-
DENT'S COMMITrEE ON URBAN HOUSING: "A DECENT HOME" (1968).
4. Grad, Research Report No. 14, in NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN
PROBLEMS (Douglas Commission) (1968).
5. Grad & Gribetz, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66
COLUM. L. REV. 1254 (1966).
6. See, eg., Housing Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-372, § 417(2), 73 Stat. 654, 677
(1959) (originally codified at 42 U.S.C. 1451 (1959)). Section 101(a) states: [T]he Sec-
retary shall give consideration to the extent to which the appropriate local public bodies
have undertaken positive programs (through the adoption, modernization, administra-
tion, and enforcement of housing... codes and regulations.. .)." Subsection (c) states
that no urban renewal contract shall be entered into, and no mortgage insured under
certain provisions of the National Housing Act, unless the locality presents a "workable
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol36/iss1/4
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nique to help maintain the existing supply of dwellings and to motivate
improvements in housing units to bring them up to current standards.
Federal incentives encouraged most local governments to adopt and
enforce housing codes.
B. Federal Support for Code Enforcement Declined
While the federal emphasis on code inspections continued into the
1970's, specific funding priority for this objective was withdrawn early
in the decade. The first step was deletion of federal Workable Program
certification requirements that had required local governments to
mount code enforcement activities to qualify for other federal develop-
ment funds.7 Next, federal funds for code enforcement were reduced8
and eventually consolidated into a general Community Development
Block Grant.9 As an eligible but not required activity, code enforce-
ment efforts competed relatively poorly with other critical housing
needs. The use of block grants also made it politically easier to carry
out subsequent federal cuts in programs for local governments. Be-
cause reductions could be made to one consolidated grant, rather than
in multiple categorical programs, the depth, scope, and impact of the
cuts were masked by percentage reductions. These reductions left local
governments largely on their own in meeting their self-imposed (but
federally-enticed) responsibilities for assuring compliance with their
own codes.
C. Municipal Responses to Loss of Federal Funds
1. Code Enforcement Was Often Neglected
Faced with these funding losses, some local governments simply
stopped enforcing housing codes. Local officials justified their inaction
on grounds that enforcement ultimately accelerated abandonment of
deteriorated dwellings by forcing uneconomical repairs. Many munici-
program," to be certified by the Secretary, which shall include "a minimum standard
housing code ... deemed adequate by the Secretary," who must be satisfied that the
locality is carrying out an effective program of code enforcement.
7. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-152, § 101, 83
Stat. 379 (1969) (originally codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1720 (1969)).
8. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-609, 84 Stat. 1770
(1970). Appropriations earmarked for code enforcement were reduced for fiscal year
1971.
9. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat.
633 (1974) (originally codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5301-17 (Supp. IV 1974)).
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palities were in generally dire economic circumstances. With insuffi-
cient funding for traditional local government services, local officials
had little inclination to fund the improvement of privately owned hous-
ing stock. Without federal funding for inspections and with cutbacks
in funds for housing rehabilitation, code enforcement was usually
neglected.
2. A Point-of-Sale Housing Inspection Strategy Evolved
Other municipalities, however, responded by redesigning their code
enforcement programs. One strategy was to require inspections at the
time of sale or transfer of owner-occupied units and at the time of
change in occupancy of rental units. Code enforcement traditionally
occurred in designated "conservation areas" and through area-wide en-
forcement programs that involved large-scale, costly efforts to repair
and improve all units within a specific area of the city.10 Alternatively,
enforcement occurred through inspections that came in response to
complaints about a unit's condition by neighbors or tenants.
The new approach changed not only the timing of inspections, but
also made the enforcement process essentially self-initiating. By re-
quiring owners themselves to initiate and obtain municipal code inspec-
tions of their property prior to sale, transfer, or re-rental, local
governments avoid conducting major enforcement programs. Other
enforcement efforts can focus on complaints. This strategy allows gov-
ernment to transfer inspection costs to property owners as a type of
user fee paid by persons utilizing government services.
3. Legal Challenges to Point-of-Sale Inspections
Landlords and other property owners resisted the point-of-sale in-
spection strategy. The combination of transferring inspection costs to
property owners, the potential threat of criminal sanctions for failure
to obtain an inspection report, and the pressure to repair by lenders
who refused to provide sales financing without a satisfactory inspection
report led to legal challenges to these ordinances. 1
10. The ineffectiveness and inefficiency of this approach is discussed in REPORT,
UNITED STATES NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 146 (1968).
11. See, eg., Butcher v. City of Detroit, 131 Mich. App. 698, 347 N.W.2d 702
(1984) (Butcher 1); Butcher v. City of Detroit, 156 Mich. App. 165, 401 N.W.2d 260
(1986) (Butcher II), consolidated appeal denied, 428 Mich. 862, 400 N.W.2d 598 (1987),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2482 (1987); Louisville Bd. of Realtors v. City of Louisville, 634
S.W.2d 163 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982); Sokolov v. Village of Freeport, 52 N.Y.2d 341, 420
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol36/iss1/4
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The Detroit, Michigan, ordinance has generated more than 150,000
inspections over the last thirteen years. 2 In June 1987, the ordinance
was sustained after six years of litigation when the United States
Supreme Court declined to review two Michigan appellate court deci-
sions in Butcher v. Detroit. 3 These decisions reversed trial court in-
junctions preventing enforcement of Detroit's ordinance and upheld
the ordinance, 4 which required inspections of one- and two-family
dwellings at the time of sale or transfer. Detroit's ordinance is gener-
ally representative of those enacted in other municipalities throughout
the country.
15
II. THE POTENTIAL FOR WIDER ADOPTION OF THE POINT-OF-
SALE INSPECTION STRATEGY
Judicial validation of code enforcement at point of sale or transfer
may spur other local governments to adopt this technique. 6 Based on
N.E.2d 55, 438 N.Y.S.2d 257, (1981); Dome Realty v. Paterson, 83 N.J. 212, 416 A.2d
334, (1980); Wilson v. City of Cincinnati, 46 Ohio St. 2d 138, 346 N.E.2d 666 (1976).
12. Interview with Creighton Lederer, Director of Building & Safety Engineering,
City of Detroit (Mar. 1, 1989).
13. Butcher I, 131 Mich. App. 698, 347 N.W.2d 702 (1984); Butcher II, 156 Mich.
App. 165, 401 N.W.2d 260 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2482 (1987).
14. The plaintiff-seller inherited a house in Detroit and then decided to sell it. At
the closing, the buyer refused to complete the sale because the seller had not obtained an
inspection or report from the city. The seller performed about $1,000 in repairs to
obtain a city certificate of approval. The buyer refused to raise the sale price to include
the repair costs. After the sale, the seller initiated a class action to have the ordinance
held invalid and to obtain a refund of all inspection fees charged to date. The trial court
enjoined enforcement of the ordinance and ordered the refund of what ultimately would
have been more than $19,000,000 in inspection fees. The Michigan Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded to the trial court for consideration of challenges to the ordi-
nance that had not been decided before the initial appeal. On the second appeal, the
appellate court upheld the ordinance and reversed the trial court's second attempt to
enjoin enforcement of the ordinance. Both appellate decisions were consolidated in an
appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, which denied review.
15. See DETROIT, MICH., CODE §§ 26-3-1 to 26-3-11 (1985).
16. At the time of this writing, another challenge to Detroit's ordinance is pending
in the Michigan Court of Appeals, Joy Mgmt. v. City of Detroit, No. 85-51187-CH
(Wayne County Cir. Ct. 1988) appeal docketed No. 110685 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 3,
1988). Initially, a circuit judge issued a temporary restraining order blocking a criminal
prosecution pending in the 36th District Court against the plaintiffs for ordinance viola-
tions. Albeit called an injunction, the order prevented the city's enforcement of the
ordinance against the plaintiffs on constitutional grounds. After a second judge failed to
lift the order, the city made an emergency appeal. The appellate court ordered the trial
judge to hear the city's motion to dismiss the restraining order and it was lifted. After
referral to a third judge for trial, and following on cross-motions for summary judgment
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Detroit's experience, the strategy has shown real promise in dealing
with the problem of maintaining housing condition standards in the
existing housing stock.
The strategy has been successful in major urban centers17 that con-
tain deteriorating dwellings, as well as in more affluent suburbs, such as
those around Detroit, where inspection fees and repair costs are less
significant given higher overall suburban housing prices. In more pros-
perous suburbs, assuring that repairs and improvements are under-
taken can head off future housing deterioration.
This enforcement strategy demonstrates that local solutions rather
than national prescriptions can resolve problems with national impact.
It also shows that necessity breeds invention. At one time, local gov-
ernments only attempted to enforce housing codes when solicited by
targeted federal funding support. Despite the withdrawal of these
funds, some municipalities have stepped in to carry out enforcement
functions. In doing so, they have adopted a strategy that seems to meet
the trial court upheld the city's ordinance in the face of plaintiffs' scatter-gun attack on
its validity. Joy Mgmt. v. City of Detroit, No. 85-51187-CH (Wayne County Cir. Ct.
July 20, 1988) (order granting summary judgment).
The plaintiff-appellants have raised several issues on appeal. In addition to a renewed
contention that the ordinance violates due process, an issue extensively addressed in the
Butcher decisions, plaintiffs assert a conflict with state housing law requirements. Plain-
tiffs contend that the city must provide advance notice of violations before initiating
judicial proceedings for enforcement of the ordinance. Their argument analogizes city
procedures to procedures under state housing law that provide for notice of discovered
defects so that owners can make repairs. Plaintiffs contend that state housing require-
ments limit municipal power to enact stricter enforcement measures.
Two arguments attack the validity of pending criminal proceedings against the indi-
vidual plaintiffs, contending they are not covered by the ordinance because they were
merely agents, who executed affidavits on behalf of the corporate purchaser certifying
that the purchaser would not occupy units until an inspection was performed and re-
pairs were made. In the pending prosecutions, it is alleged that plaintiffs made no re-
pairs to units they obtained from HUD, which was disposing of repossessed, federally
insured, abandoned units and nevertheless rented the units to unsuspecting and unso-
phisticated tenants. They argue that, as agents of the purchasers, they do not come
within the "class" of persons (sellers) who may be prosecuted under the ordinance.
Another argument made by the plaintiffs is that the ordinance is unconstitutionally
vague because another ordinance also requires inspections of tenanted units. The indi-
vidual plaintiffs contend that potential sanctions of up to $500 and one year in jail for
each day the ordinance is violated constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
Briefs have been filed as of February 1989. Oral arguments were not scheduled as of
this writing.
17. Various cities, including Paterson, N.J., Detroit, Mich., Louisville, Ky., and
Cincinnati, Ohio, have relied on judicial validation of code enforcement at the point of
sale or transfer.
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two professed objectives - upgrading the housing stock and prevent-
ing fraud - while utilizing a generally effective and cost-efficient
mechanism.
A point-of-sale ordinance assures prospective homebuyers and rent-
ers that they will be better informed about a unit's condition through
the inspection report. Also, the timing of the inspection helps ensure
that necessary repairs are made. New owners are motivated to carry
out repairs at purchase or immediately after taking possession. Tap-
ping these instincts ensures that the existing housing stock is upgraded.
Further, by assuring prospective purchasers of full disclosure of a
dwelling's condition, sellers will recognize the advantages of maintain-
ing their dwellings while they occupy the unit, not just when it is to be
sold or transferred.
A. Designing a Code Inspection Tactic: Detroit's Experience
Many American cities, particularly those in the Northeast and Mid-
west "rustbelts," have lost significant population and have experienced
deterioration of housing stock. Population losses were caused by the
transfer of city employment from a manufacturing to service-oriented
economy, flight of white and affluent families to the suburbs that left
increasingly minority and poorer populations in the central cities, and
relocation of businesses and jobs to suburban areas. Housing deteriora-
tion was caused by the increasing age of the housing stock, poor land
use planning and implemention, and the inability of the remaining resi-
dents to afford satisfactory housing and maintain existing units due to
unemployment and low income in the urban core.
Poorly designed and administered federal housing finance programs
have also contributed to poor urban housing conditions. These pro-
grams were intended to improve urban areas that experienced housing
deterioration and abandonment, but the programs actually accelerated,
rather than ameliorated, the problems."8 These programs mistakenly
permitted opportunities for homeownership by providing low down-
payments to relatively poor families. Because they had little equity in-
vested in the property, these families had little stake in maintaining the
unit.
Federal loans were available even though necessary repairs and im-
18. See HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES, DEFAULTS ON FHA IN-
SURED HOME MORTGAGES - DETROIT, MICHIGAN, HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERN-
MENT ACTIVITES, H.R. REP. No. 1152, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter
DEFAULTS].
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provements to the dwelling, including its plumbing, heating, and elec-
trical systems, had not been performed. The unsuspecting lower
income buyers were later unable to pay these repair and improvement
costs. In other instances, federal inspections, on which the government
relied in making its loans, failed to identify needed work. 9 These fail-
ures were occasionally the result of fraud that occurred when a large
number of units were repossessed and resold.20 Thus, when problems
that should have been anticipated arose with the dwelling's condition,
or when problems were finally discovered, families were likely to aban-
don the unit rather than undertake costly repairs. The inattention fre-
quently increased the cost of needed repairs. Lower income families
who could barely meet their monthly mortgage payments could not
afford repairs and had little chance to obtain financing. Neither the
federal government nor these families anticipated the need for setting
aside money to maintain the unit. Federal rehabilitation grants and
loans had been severely cut, and private sector assistance was generally
unavailable.
1. Detroit's Ordinance Responded to a Crisis of Abandonments
Exacerbated by Federal Government Incompetence
Detroit was among the cities suffering most from these problems. In
fact, its inspection ordinance evolved directly from the city's attempt to
deal with federal incompetence. By 1972, the federal Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) had become the city's largest
landowner, holding title to thousands of repossessed properties
throughout Detroit. Alarmed by this situation, HUD officials disposed
of these units by sale on an "as is" basis. HUD did not ensure that the
units it repossessed and resold met local code standards. Sales were
made either to unsophisticated buyers for their own residence or to
speculators who made cosmetic repairs and resold the units to unwary
owner-occupants. In either event, the result was the transfer of dwell-
ings that violated city code standards to unsophisticated persons with
insufficient funds to remedy defects that could have been disclosed by
an inspection.
Abandonment was exacerbated by the sheer number of HUD-fi-
nanced units abandoned and then repossessed by HUD: more than
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8,000 units were in HUD's Detroit inventory in 1974.21 In fact, this
volume created a service industry of boarding up abandoned units.
The turnaround time for HUD's resale of repossessed units could be as
long as two years. During that time, the sight of other abandoned
units, boarded up and unrepaired, reinforced the owner's tendency to
abandon rather than pour more money into an investment that proba-
bly would not hold its value after repairs. In short, abandoned units
tended to infect surrounding houses and whole neighborhoods.22
Detroit officials recognized that without municipal intervention the
sale of "as is" HUD-repossessed units would intensify the deterioration
of its housing stock. Abandoned and dilapidated units were having an
adverse impact on the remainder of the city's housing supply. The
blight of abandoned houses was spreading. 23 Detroit needed a mecha-
nism to maintain its existing stock and to respond to what was essen-
tially a fraud on unsophisticated purchasers carried out unwittingly or
otherwise through HUD's policies.24
The city had little money available for handling its immense housing
problems. Declining local property and income taxes hurt city finances
at a time when the federal government continued to require cities to
21. Id. at 858.
22. DEFAULTS, supra note 18, at 5.
23. Id.
24. The preamble of Detroit's ordinance tells the story:
WHEREAS, A substantial number of substandard dwellings have been sold in the
City of Detroit, often by fraudulent means, by private real estate investors and
speculators; many of these dwellings have been first purchased from or insured by
the Federal Government and do not meet even minimum standards of habitability
and liveability, and
WHEREAS, the danger to the health and safety of the people of the City of De-
troit will assume crisis proportions because of the actions of the U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development ... which instructs the Detroit HUD Area
Office to use as its 'primary technique' sale on an 'as is' basis 'without warranty' for
disposal of its present inventory of at least 8,000 existing dwellings, which number
is being augmented by at least one additional dwelling unit every two hours of the
day; and
WHEREAS, This will increase the number of sales of these dwellings which have
been previously abandoned by their owners and will also have the effect of increas-
ing the sale of other dwellings in the City caused by the blighting influence of such
HUD homes and the failure of HUD to repair such HUD acquired properties; and
WHEREAS, The citizens of Detroit urgently need protection from sales and re-
sales of such property without full disclosure of such deficiencies in habitability and
without assurance that the dwelling will be repaired so as to meet minimum stan-
dards of health, safety and habitability. ...
DETROIT, MICH., CODE § 12-7-1 (1974).
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provide expensive services (especially to welfare households) without
commensurate federal financial assistance. The result was a reduction
in many local services, including massive layoffs of police officers and
firefighters, as the city struggled to remain solvent. What was needed
was an approach to maintaining existing housing that would not re-
quire massive city funding, that would identify a unit's condition, and
that would encourage owner improvements.
Buyers remained at risk whether they purchased units from HUD
directly, from commercial speculators, or simply from owner-occu-
pants. This remained true regardless of whether purchasers were fi-
nanced by HUD-insured loans, by financing from private lenders
(which was rare), or through land contracts with selling owner-occu-
pants. In all circumstances, late discovery of unanticipated repair ex-
penses along with the generally depressed condition of housing in
many neighborhoods made it likely that the cycle of abandonment
would continue. Low downpayment provisions of HUD financing
were the preeminent source of loans then available in the urban core.
Rather than attempt to pay for the costs of significant repairs, buyers
walked away when unexpected problems surfaced. This resistance to
increasing housing expenditures had a clear economic basis. Major ex-
penditures for repairs and improvements are not justified in deteriorat-
ing areas unless there is some expectation that nearby units will also
undergo rehabilitation.
Because the concepts behind the strategy were far broader than sim-
ply dealing with the problems created by HUD sales, the ordinance
encompasses all sales of these types of units. Whether the housing unit
is sold by HUD or someone else, few potential buyers in inner-city
areas have the requisite knowledge properly to assess its condition.
Thus, the wider application of the concept was clearly merited.
2. The Operation of the Ordinance
Detroit enacted the ordinance in 1972, and several housekeeping
amendments followed it over the next five years. 25 The city borrowed
and adapted an approach introduced in 1967 in University City, Mis-
souri, a St. Louis suburb that was undergoing racial transition.26 Uni-
versity City's ordinance applied to both renter and owner-occupied
25. DETROIT, MICH., CODE § 12-7-1 (1974). The ordinance was recodified as DE-
TROIT, MICH., CODE § 26-3-1 (1985)"
26. Downs, Saunders & Collins, Occupancy Permits Provide An Older Suburb With
An Anti-Blight Tool, 32 J. HOUSING 506 (1975).
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dwelling units and, like Detroit's ordinance, focused on the point when
a change in occupancy occurred.
Detroit's ordinance requires the seller to provide the buyer with an
inspection report obtained through a city inspection prior to transfer or
sale of the property. 27 Owners of one- and two-family dwellings are
expected to call the city for an appointment for an inspection. A fee,
currently about $140, is charged for conducting the inspection and pre-
paring the owner's report. After repairs are completed and a reinspec-
tion shows compliance, the city issues a Certificate of Approval that is
analogous to a post-construction occupancy permit.
Unless purchasers knowingly waive their right to a Certificate, re-
pairs must be made prior to sale.28 This allows the purchaser to bar-
gain with the seller over price in terms of who will pay for bringing the
unit up to code standards. Presumably, buyers would waive the Certif-
icate if they could make repairs themselves for less than any negotiated
price reduction stimulated by the inspection report.
To facilitate enforcement of the ordinance, the buyer may proceed
against the seller for the costs of making repairs required by the code.
Failure to provide the purchaser with the report creates an "implied
warranty" that the property meets the applicable code standards, and
the purchaser may sue to enforce the warranty.29 The owner's failure
to provide the purchaser with an inspection report is a misdemeanor.
The sanction applies either to the failure to obtain an inspection report
or to provide it to the buyer before sale.3° No restriction directly pre-
vents the sale.
Transfers without consideration, such as gifts or testamentary dispo-
sitions, are excepted from the ordinance because the availability of
funding for repairs is less likely in such circumstances. Also excepted
are sales occurring after the purchaser has occupied the unit for one
year under a lease, since the buyer is presumed to have sufficient
knowledge of the premises. Furthermore, the condition of the unit has
been largely within the tenant's responsibility during his lease. This
exception is particularly appropriate where the unit was inspected as a
rental unit prior to its lease, as now required under a new Detroit
27. DETROIT, MICH., CODE § 26-3-2 (1985).
28. DETROIT, MICH., CODE § 26-3-7 (1985).
29. DETROIT, MICH., CODE § 26-3-10 (1985).
30. DETROIT, MICH., CODE § 26-3-2(2) (1985). A 10-day waiting period is speci-
fied to ensure that the buyer has enough time to receive assistance in determining the
cost of repairs. Id.
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ordinance.31
B. The Ordinances Have Withstood a Variety of Legal Attacks
A number of cities have adopted point-of-sale housing inspection or-
dinances. Their existence is noticeable primarily because of litigation
generated by real estate interests, property owners, and landlords. Cit-
ies in Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, California, Kentucky, and New
York, as well as a number of other Michigan cities, have enacted simi-
lar inspection provisions. In some cases, the provisions apply only to
tenanted properties with the inspection occurring upon a change in ten-
ants. Many jurisdictions, however, have required inspections at the
time of sale or other transfer of residential property as well as at the
time of re-rental.
The legal challenges to these ordinances cover a wide spectrum.
Most courts, particularly those recently reviewing such ordinances,
have rejected the challenges. The authority of local governments to
enact point-of-sale ordinances has been consistently upheld. While one
court noted that private contractors also perform similar inspections
for a fee, that court implicitly held that the availability of private in-
spection services did not prevent government from carrying out that
function.32 The Michigan Supreme Court, in reviewing that decision,
held that under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the government
could not be sued even when the inspection may have been deficient.33
The buyer's only redress is against the seller.
Courts have held that point-of-sale inspections are within the scope
of local government police powers to protect residents' health, safety,
and welfare.34 Local government may require inspections and repairs
31. DETROIT, MICH., CODE § 26-3-3(2) (1985).
32. Brand v. Hartman, 122 Mich. App. 326, 330-31, 333, 332 N.W.2d 479, 481-82
(1983), rev'd on other grounds, 422 Mich. 884 (1985). The Michigan Supreme Court, in
a redefinition of the scope of sovereign immunity, reversed the Court of Appeals 2-1.
The high court held that inspections were not an essential function entitling government
immunity against liability for negligent inspections.
33. 422 Mich. 884, 368 N.W.2d 231 (1985). The court summarily reversed, follow-
ing its seminal decision in Ross v. Consumers Power Co., 420 Mich. 567, 363 N.W.2d
641 (1985).
34. A traditional description of that power, on which the Butcher court relied, is
found in Cady v. Detroit, 289 Mich. 499, 514, 286 N.W. 805, 810-11 (1939):
Ordinances having for their purpose regulated municipal development, the security
of home life, the preservation of a favorable environment in which to rear children,
the protection of morals and health, the safeguarding of the economic structure
upon which the public good depends, the stabilization of the use and value of prop-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol36/iss1/4
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even as to owner-occupants after it determines all units must meet cer-
tain habitability standards.
Other legal challenges have urged that state inspection laws preempt
local ordinances.35 While such questions depend on state, not federal,
law, no court has denied a municipality power to set its own housing
standards in this context.
Constitutional attacks have been made on three grounds. One has
been based on prohibitions against government "takings" of private
property without just compensation. Courts have rejected this argu-
ment, pointing out that transfer of the property is not prevented; sanc-
tions are imposed only for failing to obtain an inspection.36 Of course,
the buyer may sue the seller for breach of warranty and, in turn, the
city may require the buyer himself to bring the property up to code
standards. Imposing the costs of inspection and repairs, even though
the costs must be paid as a result of the ordinance, does not constitute a
taking.3 7 Nor do these ordinances exceed a city's inherent authority to
inspect an owner's property to ensure that applicable codes are met
where it reasonably believes an inspection is justified. This authority
exists independently of a point-of-sale ordinance. The government de-
cision that a sufficient basis exists for inspecting at the time of sale or
transfer is entitled to judicial deference.3" That local decision is partic-
ularly appropriate in light of the experience of many cities with major
housing problems that involve deterioration, abandonment, and frauds
on purchasers.
Challenges based on equal protection have failed to overturn ordi-
nances that apply only to certain types of units, or to specific types of
tenure, or which exempt certain transactions. Courts have found a ra-
tional basis for the distinctions made.39
The third constitutional challenge, which had some early success,
argued that point-of-sale inspections violate state and federal constitu-
erty, the attraction of a desirable citizenship and fostering its permanency are
within the proper ambit of the police power. Changes in such regulations must be
sought through the ballot or the legislative branch.
Id.
35. Butcher I, 131 Mich. App. at 704-06, 347 N.W.2d at 706.
36. Id. at 707, 347 N.W.2d at 707.
37. Id. at 708, 347 N.W.2d at 707.
38. Butcher 11, 156 Mich. App. at 172, 401 N.W.2d at 264. See also Dome Realty
v. Paterson, 83 N.J. 212, 226, 416 A.2d 334, 342 (1980).
39. Id.
Washington University Open Scholarship
38 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 36:25
tional provisions against warrantless searches and seizures of private
property." The fourth amendment proscription against inspections
(searches) without judicial review of the grounds for a search warrant
has existed for twenty years.4 Recently, however, courts have found
warrants to be superfluous in the context of point-of-sale inspections. 42
The appellate review of Detroit's ordinance reached the same
conclusion.43
C. An Analysis of Legal Arguments in Detroit's Litigation
A number of these constitutional challenges were raised in two re-
lated state appellate court decisions addressing Detroit's ordinance. In
the first appeal in Butcher v. Detroit,44 the Michigan Court of Appeals
stayed a lower court injunction and upheld the ordinance. The appel-
late court determined that the city had authority as a Home Rule City
under the state constitution and under its own police powers to require
an inspection45 and to collect an inspection fee.46 The court stated:
"Such an inspection deters fraud and helps enforce the city's building
code. Both the means and goals are validly within defendant's police
power."'47 The court continued:
The particular inspection method challenged here is aimed at the
specific practice of fraudulent conveyance of homes with serious
structural and other deficiencies.... Such fraudulent transactions
pose an obvious threat to the health and welfare of defendant's
citizens, and an ordinance directed against them is within the au-
thority of the City of Detroit.48
In respect to the takings argument, the court responded:
[T]he ordinance neither destroys nor reduces the property's
value. In fact, if anything, by requiring post-inspection repairs, it
enhances value.... The inhibition is not on the transfer of prop-
40. See, e.g., Sokolov v. Village of Freeport, 52 N.Y.2d 341, 420 N.E.2d 55, 438
N.Y.S.2d 257 (1981); Hometown Co-Operative Apartments v. City of Hometown, 495
F. Supp. 55 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
41. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387
U.S. 541 (1967).
42. See Dome Realty Co. v. City of Paterson, 83 N.J. 212, 416 A.2d 334 (1980).
43. Butcher II, 156 Mich. App. at 173, 401 N.W.2d at 264.
44. Butcher 1, 131 Mich. App. at 698, 347 N.W.2d at 702.
45. Id. at 704-06, 347 N.W.2d at 706.
46. Id. at 706, 347 N.W.2d at 706.
47. Id. at 704, 347 N.W.2d at 705-06.
48. Id. at 705, 347 N.W.2d at 706.
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erty but upon the failure to have the home inspected. On the
other hand, the ordinance ensures that one- and two-family dwell-
ings meet certain minimum requirements. The ordinance is de-
fendant's way of ensuring that a buyer has more recourse on
buying a house less valuable than anticipated than merely stoically
accepting the saw "caveat emptor." Moreover, the ordinance
helps combat housing deterioration.49
On remand, the trial court again struck down the ordinance, this
time as violative of equal protection and search and seizure require-
ments. The Court of Appeals again reversed, holding that, as to equal
protection, the ordinance's exemptions were rationally related to the
legitimate governmental purposes of the ordinance - "protecting buy-
ers from latent housing defects and from fraud on the part of the
seller."5°
On the search and seizure issue, the Court of Appeals examined the
twenty-year-old search warrant requirement set forth in the United
States Supreme Court's decisions in Camara v. Municipal Court5" and
See v. City of Seattle.52 These cases held that search warrants were re-
quired in the context of residential and commercial building inspec-
tions. Several courts, including the highest courts of New York53 and
Ohio,54 have held that housing inspections occurring with point-of-sale
ordinances require a warrant if the owner requests one. On the other
hand, the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1980," and the Kentucky
Court of Appeals in 1982,56 held that recourse to a warrant procedure
was unnecessary in these circumstances.
In Camara, the Court stated:
Under the present system, when the inspector demands entry, the
occupant has no way of knowing whether enforcement of the mu-
nicipal code involved requires inspection of his premises, no way
of knowing the lawful limits of the inspector's power to search,
and no way of knowing whether the inspector himself is acting
49. Id. at 707, 347 N.W.2d at 707.
50. Butcher I1, 156 Mich. App. at 170, 401 N.W.2d at 263.
51. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
52. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
53. Sokolov v. Village of Freeport, 52 N.Y.2d 341, 420 N.E.2d 55, 438 N.Y.S.2d
257 (1981).
54. Wilson v. City of Cincinnati, 46 Ohio St. 2d 138, 346 N.E.2d 666 (1976).
55. Dome Realty v. Paterson, 83 N.J. 212, 416 A.2d 334 (1980).
56. Louisville Bd. of Realtors v. City of Louisville, 634 S.W.2d 163, 166 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1982).
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under proper authorization. These are questions that may be re-
viewed by a neutral magistrate.... 7
The Court, however, stopped short of requiring the inspector to
show "probable cause" prior to obtaining a warrant. It pointed out
that "the need for the inspection must be weighed in terms of the rea-
sonable goals of code enforcement."58
In the context of a point-of-sale or change-in-occupancy ordinance,
the legislative judgment has determined that the need exists for an in-
spection at that specified time. By doing so, this decision subsumes the
warrant issue in that legislative determination.
In contrast to the area-wide inspection scheme at issue in Camara,
Detroit's point-of-sale ordinance contains a warrant authorization pro-
cess, applicable when the owner requests that one be obtained. 59 The
Michigan Court of Appeals, however, pointed out that use of a warrant
is superfluous to an inspection at point of sale. Referring to the reason-
ing in the 1980 New Jersey Dome Realty v. Paterson60 case, the court
found that Detroit's ordinance "contains all the necessary protection
against unreasonable searches and is not subject to the constitutional
warrant requirement." The court reasoned:
Many inspections will occur just prior to sale when the struc-
tures are vacant and the owner's expectations of privacy are rela-
tively low. In addition, the housing inspector has no discretion
regarding which structures are to be searched. An inspection
under the ordinance only occurs when the owner-seller requests
one. The inspection is restricted to the published guidelines re-
quired by the ordinance. Thus, both the scope and the timing of
the inspection are known by the owner in advance. Furthermore,
the inspection has no connection with a criminal investigation.
The presence of violations has no punitive consequences for the
landlord. In such a situation, we conclude that the inspection pro-
cess itself effectively provides the assurances and safeguards of a
warrant and renders the procurement of a search warrant
unnecessary.61
The New York and Ohio decisions that struck down point-of-sale
inspections on fourth amendment grounds both involved ordinances
with no provision for obtaining a warrant. The court decisions failed
57. Camara, 387 U.S. at 532.
58. Id at 535.
59. DETROIT, MICH., CODE § 26-3-4(c) (1985).
60. Dome Realty v. Paterson, 83 N.J. 212, 416 A.2d 334 (1980).
61. Butcher II, 156 Mich. App. at 173-74, 401 N.W.2d at 264.
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to analyze the rationale for use of a warrant and the legislative judg-
ment respecting the need for an inspection at a particular time. Unless
the legislative determination of the need to have inspections at the
point of sale or re-rental is flawed, however, there is little left for judici-
ary inquiry; thus, there is no need for the process that is undertaken
when warrants are deemed necessary. Moreover, if the inspection is
conducted in response to an appointment made by the owner, it seems
somewhat convoluted to require a warrant to validate the governmen-
tal inspection, especially because the necessity of the inspection at such
times was determined with the enactment of the ordinance.
The New York and Ohio courts were concerned that property own-
ers would be forced to accede to a warrantless inspection in order to
sell or rent their property. The legislature's determination that inspec-
tions are then necessary should be dispositive of that concern, however.
A substantial governmental interest in such inspections has been estab-
lished. The importance of the Michigan, New Jersey, and Kentucky
courts' analysis is that they have examined the rationale of Camara
and found it inapplicable under these circumstances. Thus, housing
inspections at the time of sale and transfer avoid a possible constitu-
tional confrontation that can occur with traditional code enforcement
strategies.
Ideally, the decisions upholding point-of-sale inspections will inform
other jurisdiction of the availability of this strategy for code enforce-
ment. Much can be said in its support.
Because point-of-sale inspections are triggered by a commercial
transaction that occurs when the unit is less likely to be occupied, they
are far less of an imposition on the owner's privacy than an area-wide
inspection process. Inspections are less disruptive when the unit is va-
cant. The inspection is arranged by appointment and is initiated by the
seller, not the government. The inspection system gives lenders confi-
dence in the property and encourages them to lend in locations where
they might otherwise refuse credit. Finally, the inspection occurs when
funding for repairs is more likely to be available.
III. ANALYZING THE IMPACT OF INSPECTION FEES
AND REPAIR COSTS
Significantly, this inspection strategy is not dependent on govern-
mental funding for code enforcement. By imposing inspection costs on
the property owner through inspection fees, this strategy transfers in-
spection costs from governments reluctant to fund or give priority to
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inspection activities because of more pressing demands for other hous-
ing and city services. While these "user fees" are imposed on the prop-
erty owners, the costs are incurred when funds are most likely to be
available to them.
In many cases, the seller will cover the costs of inspection and re-
pairs from the proceeds of the sale. If repair costs are seen as delayed
maintenance expenses, these are properly an obligation of the seller.
As in any sales transaction, however, the costs can be transferred to the
purchaser by lowering the purchase price. If the purchaser believes he
can make the repairs himself at a lower cost, he can negotiate a lower
price and spread repayments over the term of the loan.
Federal, state, local, and private rehabilitation loans and grants are
more likely to be available at the time of sale. The new owner is moti-
vated to take advantage of these sources and to ensure the unit is in
good condition before occupying or renting it. Finally, the inspection
fee is a relatively minor part of the closing costs of property whose
value has increased. These inspections also educate more purchasers,
so that price better relates to value.
Generally, inspections of rental units, whether at time of change in
occupancy or not, impose inspection fees upon the landlord. While
these fees and repair costs may be transferred to the tenants through
rent increases, as often occurs with property tax increases, these costs
are frequently treated as operating expenses and are not necessarily
covered immediately by rent increases. Where rent controls apply,
some ordinances allow inspection and repair costs to be amortized by
future rent increases.
Whether the inspection comes at the time of sale or re-rental, the
owner is more likely to carry out repairs when funding is available to
cover them. In this regard, the focus on time of sale or transfer or
change in tenancy provides a significant opportunity to ensure owner
participation in repair and improvement activities. Without the availa-
bility of loan financing, the proceeds from a sale, or an occasion to set
or modify rents, owners are less likely voluntarily to make needed re-
pairs and improvements.
If financial resources are available when inspections occur and re-
pairs and improvements are identified, voluntary action is facilitated.
This is a better means to ensure repairs than a threat of criminal sanc-
tions, which has been a traditional but ineffective method of code en-
forcement. Courts are reluctant to impose sanctions for failure to
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make repairs, particularly uneconomical ones, unless the conditions are
egregious.
IV. CONCLUSION
Inspections at point of sale or change in occupancy make a good deal
of sense. The concept may ensure that over time (six years is the cur-
rent national average between moves for families) a city's existing
housing stock can be brought into code compliance. Detroit, which
has approximately 420,000 dwellings, conducted more than 150,000 in-
spections during the last ten years.6 2 While the problem of adequate
code enforcement is not solved immediately, the pace is steady. The
point-of-sale inspection, moreover, does not replace other inspection
alternatives, such as those that respond to complaints or where conser-
vation treatment justifies area-wide enforcement. It simply assures
substantially more progress in maintaining the housing stock than in
its absence.
62. Interview with Creighton Lederer, Director of Building & Safety Engineering,
City of Detroit (Mar. 1, 1989).
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